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An effective and efficient system of Internet' regulation
requires a workable system of boundary definition and mainte-
nance.2 In the physical world, drawing and maintaining bound-
aries are frequently the subjects of litigation. It is likely that
virtual boundary definition will similarly become a popular
subject of litigation, and such definition will be no less legally
problematic in the virtual world than it is in the physical world.
t A.B. 1991, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 1996, The University of Chicago.
The Internet, Cyberspace, and the Net are terms used throughout this Comment to
refer to the collection of roughly 2.2 million computers now connected by interlinked
computer networks.
2 Although the courts have had only a handful of opportunities to address the legal
issues raised by the use of this new medium, increased interest in the Internet by the leg-
islative and executive branches, as well as by law enforcement agencies, suggests that the
law will soon be called upon to resolve a variety of disputes on the information super-
highway. Cases addressing Internet issues include United States v Morris, 928 F2d 504
(2d Cir 1991) (prosecution of the creator of the "Internet Worm"); Cubby, Inc. v
CompuServe Inc., 776 F Supp 135 (S D NY 1991) (holding that a commercial computer
bulletin board service is a distributor for purposes of libel); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v
Maphia, 857 F Supp 679 (N D Cal 1994) (holding computer bulletin board service liable
for copyright and trademark infringement); United States v LaMacchia, 871 F Supp 535
(D Mass 1994) (holding that person who distributed copyrighted software through a
computer bulletin board service did not violate the wire fraud statute). For a discussion of
legislative interest in Cyberspace, see, for example, David S. Bennahum, Mr. Gingrich's
Cyber-Revolution, NY Times A19 (Jan 17, 1995); Aaron Zitner, Minority leaders move to
take off in cyberspace, Boston Globe 97 (Feb 19, 1995); Patrick J. Leahy, New Laws For
New Technologies: Current Issues Facing the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, 5
Harv J L & Tech 1 (Spring 1992). For a discussion of executive branch activity, see Peter
H. Lewis, Gore Preaches, and Practices, the Techno-Gospel, NY Times D1 (Jan 17, 1994).
For a discussion of law enforcement activity, see generally Mike Godwin, Virtual Commu-
nity Standards: BBS Obscenity Case Raises New Legal Issues, Internet WWW page
available at <http://www.eff.orgpub/legal/cases/AABBSThomasesMemphis/obscen-
virtcom.stds-godwin.article> (version current on Jan 11, 1996) (on file with U Chi L Rev);
John Perry Barlow, Crime and Puzzlement, Internet WWW page available at
<http.//www.eff.org/pub/Publications/John-PerryBarlow/HTMIJcrime -an-puzzlement-1
.html> (version current on Jan 11, 1996) (on file with U Chi L Rev); Steven Levy, The
Cyberpunks vs. Uncle Sam: Battle of the Clipper Chip, NY Times Mag 44 (June 12, 1994)
(discussing encryption and the National Security Agency's interest in the Internet); John
Schwartz, Chipping In to Curb Computer Crime: Federal Authorities Get High-Tech Help
in Tracking Down Hacker, Wash Post Al (Feb 19, 1995) (discussing law enforcement
efforts to apprehend notorious computer hacker Kevin Mitnick).
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This Comment provides legislatures, courts, and practitio-
ners with models for drawing boundaries in Cyberspace. In so
doing, it fills a pronounced gap in legal scholarship. To date,
academic analysis of Internet regulation has relied exclusively on
a conception of the Internet as a medium in constant motion.
Scholars have proposed regulatory systems designed to govern
the flow of virtual commerce by directly regulating the flow
itself.3 Although this Comment addresses many of the same
issues, it finds answers not in the swirl of flowing information,
but in the relatively fixed boundaries that separate systems from
systems, individuals from individuals, and communities from
communities.
Section I of this Comment sets out three paradigmatic
boundary models for the Internet, analyzes the unique features of
each, and briefly describes the extent to which each model has
gained acceptance in Cyberspace. Section II considers the extent
to which each of these boundary models would further the partic-
ular purposes of Internet regulation and concludes that, given
the variety of aims that virtual boundaries should further, there
is no single model that satisfies all of the goals of Internet regu-
lation. This Comment recommends a more principled approach to
regulating Cyberspace, one that uses different boundary models
in different regulatory contexts, depending on the dominant
interest to be served in each context.
I. BOUNDARY MODELS FOR THE INTERNET
Current judicial and legislative approaches to Cyberspace
rely on a conception of bounded property developed to regulate
the ownership of land.4 Under this conception, property "denotes
not material things but certain rights."' Arguably the most im-
' Commentators do this by analogizing to existing regulatory schemes that regulate
the flow of commerce or information in the physical world. See generally Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., Access to the National Information Infrastructure, 30 Wake Forest L Rev 51, 62-67
(1995) (discussing statutory common carrier obligations imposed on communications net-
works). See also David R. Johnson and Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Com-
munications Onto Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (and Our
Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 Vil L Rev 487, 498-506 (1993) (suggesting that the develop-
ment of trucking industry regulation could provide a paradigm for Internet regulation).
' For one example, see the discussion of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in text
accompanying notes 52-61.
' Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Philosophy 45 (Archon
1967) ("[A] property right is a relation not between an owner and a thing, but between the
owner and other individuals in reference to things."). Cohen's observations are particu-
larly applicable in the context of the Internet, where, as the things at issue become less
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portant of these is the "right to exclude": the right to prevent
access by others to one's land.6 But the right to exclude depends
on the existence of adequately clear boundaries; the law must de-
fine that from which the property owner may exclude others.
Boundaries at the level of computer systems have gained
widespread acceptance as the appropriate means of regulating
the Internet. This Section, therefore, first examines how system-
level boundaries currently operate in Cyberspace. It then discuss-
es two alternative boundary models, with their respective advan-
tages and disadvantages.
A. The System-Level Boundary Model
A computer system, as the term is used in this Comment, is
a computer or an isolated network of computers that is connected
to the Internet, provides Internet-related computer services7 to
its users, and is governed by a system administrator. System
administrators are individuals or groups of individuals charged
with managing a local computer system. An administrator's tasks
are, for the most part, limited to performing day-to-day mainte-
nance and ensuring that computer connections within the system
and with the Internet are functioning properly. Most importantly,
it is the system administrator who allocates access to those wish-
ing to enter the system.8
The principal tool for excluding others from a local system is
called a "firewall." An external firewall is a barrier between the
local system and the Internet that allows only authorized individ-
uals to enter the local system.9 An external firewall thus gives
well defined, the relational nature of property rights becomes more clear.
c Id at 46 ("The essence of private property is always the right to exclude others.").
See also Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 US 419, 435 (1982) ("The
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in
an owner's bundle of property rights.") (citations omitted). Other traditional property
rights include the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, and the right to
security. See A.M. HonorS, Ownership, in A.G. Guest, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence:
A Collaborative Work 107, 112-24 (Oxford 1961).
" Examples of Internet-related computer services include electronic mail, the ability
to transfer files to and from other locations on the Internet, and the ability to access the
World Wide Web.
8 The system administrator distributes passwords to local system users and sets
policy regarding when and to what those passwords may be changed. Frequently, a
system administrator will grant access privileges to users of other "friendly" systems. The
system administrator monitors these connections and the activities of such users on the
local system. The system administrator, in short, not only builds the moat around the
castle but also decides when and for whom the drawbridge will be lowered.
' See William R. Cheswick and Steven M. Bellovin, Firewalls and Internet Security:
1996]
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the system administrator the power to exclude others. Internal
firewalls allow the system administrator to control authorized
users' activities on the system by limiting their access to different
parts of the system.'0 Just as an external firewall prevents out-
side individuals from entering without authorization, internal
firewalls exclude users from certain parts of that system. For
example, a university system administrator might set up several
internal firewalls-in addition to the external firewall between
the university system and the Internet-to separate the student
and administrative domains of the system.
This regime of system-level boundaries, under which both
the right to exclude others and the right to regulate computer
use accrue to the system administrator, is now predominant on
the Internet. From its inception, the Internet has linked comput-
er systems. In most cases, the system administrator initially de-
termines if and how her system should be linked to the Internet.
It is not surprising, therefore, that system administrators estab-
lished these links in a way that largely preserved the integrity of
the system-level boundaries protecting their domains.
Nevertheless, this historical accident need not dictate the
future course of Internet regulation. The law remains free to
recognize other boundary models where it would be efficient or
appropriate to do so.
B. The Open-System Model
The computer networks that preceded the Internet were
designed to achieve two goals." The first was to allow research-
ers at different locations to share access to the limited number of
supercomputing facilities then available. 2 The second was to
Repelling the Wily Hacker 9, 53 (Addison-Wesley 1994) (distinguishing the "traditional"
external firewall from the more unusual internal firewall). Cheswick and Bellovin describe
a firewall as a "collection of components placed between two networks" that has the fol-
lowing properties: (1) "[a]ll traffic from inside to outside, and vice-versa, must pass
through the firewall"; (2) "[olnly authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy,
will be allowed to pass"; and (3) "[tlhe firewall itself is immune to penetration." Id at 9.
10 Id at 53-54.
" The Internet descended, albeit indirectly, from Arpanet (Advanced Research
Project Agency Network), which came online in 1969. The basic technology of the Internet
was developed and tested on Arpanet. For example, the most popular feature of the
Internet, electronic mail, or "e-mail," was first tested on Arpanet in 1971. For a discussion
of Arpanet and the circumstances surrounding its birth, see Aaron Zitner, A quiet leap
forward in cyberspace: 25 years ago, the internet was born-and not many people noticed,
Boston Globe A85, A96 (Sept 11, 1994).
12 Id at A96.
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facilitate the communication of ideas among members of these
geographically scattered research communities."
Initial efforts to develop cost-effective computer networks
had little success. Transmitting a message from beginning to end
over a single telephone line was both time consuming and prohib-
itively expensive. Researchers needed a system that would per-
mit nearly instantaneous transmission of large amounts of infor-
mation at low cost. Interconnected computer networks, incorpo-
rating packet switching, provided the solution.14
The Internet has exceeded expectations as a cost-effective
means for rapid communication between large numbers of people.
It is estimated, for example, that thirty million messages are
sent over the Internet via e-mail every day. 5 The Internet
brings together many people who would never meet under nor-
mal circumstances, and facilitates regular communication be-
tween people who would otherwise be isolated from each other. 6
In addition to facilitating personal communication between
individuals, the Internet permits rapid dissemination of informa-
tion to large audiences. Information placed on the Internet
spreads quickly from one local network to another. Within days,
a single piece of information might be replicated and disseminat-
ed to hundreds of different locations. 7 The original desire to
13 Id.
" Packet switching involves breaking down a message into smaller pieces, then
sending each piece down a separate path over the network to its destination. The comput-
ers that make up the network are interconnected in a web-like lattice in which each
location is linked to several others. This interconnection effectively results in an infinite
number of possible routes to a destination. See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Inside the
Internet: Millions Use It, But Few Understand How It Works, Computer Shopper 602, 602-
03 (Sept 1994). For further discussion of packet switching and the switching protocols
used on the Internet, see Paul Merenbloom, A Guided Tour of the TCP/IP Protocol and
Its Related Tools, Info World 61 (Aug 15, 1994). For more information about the Internet's
interlinked networks, see generally Hearing on Internet Access before the Subcommittee
on Science of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 125-
39 (Oct 4, 1994) (testimony of Jim Williams, Executive Director, Farnet, Inc.).
'5 Mike Toner, Surfing on the Internet, Atlanta J-Const F1, F1 (July 24, 1994).
16 See, for example, Mike Godwin, The Electronic Frontier Foundation and Virtual
Communities, Internet WWW page available at <http:J/198.93.154.10/~tex/innkeeping>
(version current on Jan 11, 1996) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (The cofounders of the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, an organization dedicated to promoting Internet accessibility,
used the Internet as a complement to their face-to-face contact. "In effect, they [became]
next-door neighbors, although [one founder] lived in Pinedale, Wyoming, and the other in
Brookline, Massachusetts.").
"7 The case of the Internet Worm is illustrative. See text accompanying notes 45-62.
The worm reached roughly 10 percent of the sixty thousand computers linked to the
Internet within approximately three hours of being released.
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provide a means for sharing information has, in fact, evolved into
what could be termed a communal ethic on the Internet. 18
Unfortunately, this ability to spread information rapidly
carries with it a great potential for harm. The Internet also facili-
tates the spread of computer viruses and the infringement of
copyrights, to name but two examples. 9 Actions taken on one
system will often have consequences for users of other systems.
For example, censorship of certain types of messages on a single
system will not only prevent users of that system from receiving
those messages but will also prevent users of the Internet from
receiving those messages from that particular system. The latter
effect may not be substantial in the particular instance. However,
if widespread, system-level censorship will have a considerable
effect on the life of the Internet as a whole. Sound Internet regu-
lation, therefore, must consider the ability of actions to have
consequences in Cyberspace that are both unpredictable and
difficult to measure.
Accordingly, anyone crafting legal rules for Cyberspace must
be careful to consider the impact that those rules will have in a
world where consequences can follow quickly and unexpectedly.
Given the difficulty, at the system level, of gauging the scope of
an action's ramifications for the whole Internet, a legal approach
that considered the network as a whole might be the best way to
regulate behavior.
This type of Internet-wide approach to the regulation of
Cyberspace is what this Comment terms an "open-system"e con-
ception of Internet regulation. Under this conception, the law
would look to the actions taken in Cyberspace--considering their
consequences and apparent motivations-rather than the bound-
aries crossed in the course of performing those actions. As will
become clear below,2" this approach has the advantages of con-
sidering the full extent of the world it hopes to regulate and of
providing clear rules to govern individual conduct. However, the
breadth of this approach increases the risk that the courts will
18 See Hearings on Internet Security before the Subcommittee on Science of the
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 42, 49 (1994)
(testimony of Dr. Vinton G. Cerf, President, Internet Society) ("The general spirit of
openness was and continues to be instrumental in fostering rapid evolution of the
Internet.... The Internet is filled with an endless variety of freely available information,
largely organized and made available on a voluntary basis by users eager to share what
they have learned or created.").
19 See Johnson and Marks, 38 Vill L Rev at 513 (cited in note 3).
0 See Section II.B.
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hesitate to craft rules of general applicability and will, instead,
bog down in the particulars of each case. The result would be a
legal regime characterized by inconsistent decisions and provid-
ing little guidance to those who must enforce and those who must
obey the law.
The open-system conception has been proposed almost ex-
clusively by those who think and write about the Internet. As I
have noted, those who govern the Internet are, on the whole,
adherents to the system-level conception of boundary definition.
C. The Individual-Level Boundary Model
In lieu of either system-level boundaries or an open regime
with no boundaries at all, the law might define and enforce prop-
erty rights in Cyberspace with reference to the individual user.
Under this individual-level boundary model, the law would re-
spect the boundaries established by individuals; the key feature
would be the individual user's choice to exclude others. In con-
trast to the open-system model, which would respect no bound-
aries at all, the individual-level model would respect a multiplici-
ty of boundaries. But unlike the system-level model, under the
individual-level model, system-level boundaries would be, from a
legal perspective, permeable.
The level of exclusion under an individual-level regime would
vary. For example, a user might choose to demarcate her entire
account as inaccessible to others. If her need to exclude were
more limited, she could allow access only to files or directories.
Likewise, the pool of individuals granted access could be expand-
ed or contracted as the user saw fit. The law would serve only to
enforce the individual's decisions.
II. ANALYZING VIRTUAL BOUNDARIES
This Section proposes legal rules for defining and governing
boundaries on the Internet. Section A argues that the system-
level boundary model is appropriate either where system admin-
istrators are best able to protect the interests furthered by legal
regulation or where the users of a computer system share the
relevant interests in common. Section B argues that the law
should employ the open-system model, which conceives of the
Internet as an amorphous and undefined collection of actors,
whenever interests that are common to all users of the Internet
would best be served by the application of universal rules. Final-
ly, Section C advocates the individual-level boundary model for
1996]
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those cases where either an individual interest has been recog-
nized as worthy of protection (for example, where an individual's
privacy interest is at stake) or where an individual possesses
unique knowledge of the potential value of a piece of information
to others (for example, where an author is deciding how widely to
disseminate her work).
The practical relevance of this Section is apparent. The law's
role in protecting individual privacy, encouraging commerce, and
preventing theft or destruction of property has long been recog-
nized. Other interests, although more theoretical, are no less
important: promoting collective action, encouraging the internal-
ization of external costs, and lowering monitoring costs. Although
the law does not often seek to further these interests explicitly, a
well constructed system of regulation should take them into ac-
count.
Some might question the practicality of such an ad hoc ap-
proach. One might argue, for example, that no workable legal
standard could allow violations of system-level boundaries in
commercial contexts but not in the context of corporate espio-
nage. Courts may not have the resources or expertise to deter-
mine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a line has been crossed by
a malicious trespasser or by an overzealous consumer. However,
the facial similarity of the two situations requires rules that,
rather than establishing hard and fast standards of general ap-
plicability, recognize the true nature of the suspect behavior. For
example, crossing over a system-level boundary is not always
malicious. In a world where hackers are but a small fraction of
all Internet users, laws that make every violation of system-level
boundaries a basis for liability will too often reach the behavior
of individuals with innocent (perhaps even benevolent) inten-
tions. Moreover, such rules could deter individuals roaming the
Internet from exploring new areas, since boundaries that seem
clear in the courtroom are often obscure in the virtual world. The
present legal reliance on system-level boundaries might therefore
deter the unrestricted interaction and exploration that this high-
ly interconnected system was designed to facilitate.
Although this Comment proposes a system of boundary defi-
nition that rejects a universal approach, it does not completely
reject the utility and use of bright-line rules. Although in most
cases crossing a particular boundary should not itself be disposi-
tive of liability, courts should be able to consider clear actions,




The pragmatic approach proposed by this Comment requires
courts to consider more factors than is required under current
law. However, it does not mark a sea change in cyber-jurispru-
dence. Indeed, scholars have already recognized that reliance on
a single model of virtual boundaries provides an inadequate basis
upon which to regulate the Internet.21 Further, many of the fac-
tors that this Comment urges be incorporated explicitly in legal
rules already influence and guide court decisions.22
A. The Uneasy Case for Current Law and the System-Level
Boundary Model
1. Ensuring privacy and security.
The conventional wisdom about Cyberspace is that there are
no mechanisms-legal, technological, or social-that can ensure
the security of computer systems linked to the Internet and pro-
tect the privacy of individual users of those systems. The memory
of the "Internet Worm" of 1988,23 the steady stream of reports
about sophisticated computer hackers,24 and anecdotal accounts
of private correspondence that turns out to be not so private25
have combined to shake individual and corporate confidence in
the viability of the Internet as a secure mode of communication
and commerce. It is not surprising, therefore, that ensuring pri-
vacy and security, both as an end in itself and as a means of
inspiring public confidence, has become a principal goal of those
who use and manage the Internet.
To date, the battles for system security and user privacy
have been fought almost entirely at the system level.26 The sys-
See notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
See, for example, text accompanying notes 55-61.
See Calvin Sims, Researchers Fear Computer 'Virus' Will Slow Use of National Net-
work, NY Times B6, B6 (Nov 14, 1988) (quoting Russell Brand of Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratories: "There is a giant danger that people will overreact and to protect
themselves will not use the network and thus reduce its effectiveness.").
" See, for example, Mary B.W. Tabor and Anthony Ramirez, Computer Savvy, With
an Attitude: Young Working-Class Hackers Accused of High-Tech Crime, NY Times B1, B7
(July 23, 1992).
2 See, for example, Dan Pacheco, Easy-to-Crack Passwords Leave E-Mail Vulnerable,
Denver Post 1E, 1E (Oct 27, 1994) (discussing ways to protect e-mail communications).
26 This is not to say that an individual cannot protect her own privacy on the Internet
using a variety of measures, ranging from the very simple to the extraordinarily complex.
See generally Alfred Poor, Watch Your Back: It's a dangerous digital world, so protect your
data, Computer Shopper 550 (Mar 1995). For example, all users can protect themselves to
a considerable degree by varying their passwords frequently and by being careful to avoid
dictionary words and words and names of particular significance to the user. See
1996]
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tem administrator, charged with constructing and maintaining
the system-level firewall, is in the best position to protect securi-
ty and privacy through use of that firewall. The firewall pre-
vents infiltration of the system not only by shielding it from vi-
ruses spreading across the Internet28 but also by shutting out
hackers set on either sabotaging the system or accessing individ-
ual files and e-mail records.
Federal law regarding privacy and security reflects the use of
system-level boundaries. The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, for example, accepts the system border as the bound-
ary to be protected.29 Liability for stealing an electronic file, for
instance, requires gaining unauthorized access to a computer
system or exceeding the authorized level of access on that sys-
tem." Similarly, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986
makes either accessing a computer system without authorization
or exceeding the authorized level of system access the initial
Cheswick and Bellovin, Firewalls and Internet Security at 11 (cited in note 9); Pacheco,
Easy-to-Crack Passwords, Denver Post at El (cited in note 25).
' For an excellent introduction to the technology of Internet security, see generally
Cheswick and Bellovin, Firewalls and Internet Security (cited in note 9). For a discussion
of firewalls and the gateways through them, see id at 51-83.
' For a discussion of computer viruses and the legal response to them, see generally
Bradley S. Davis, Note, It's Virus Season Again, Has Your Computer Been Vaccinated?: A
Survey of Computer Crime Legislation as a Response to Malevolent Software, 72 Wash U L
Q 411 (1994).
2 Pub L No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848, codified in relevant part at 18 USC § 2701 (1994).
Section 2701(a) provides that anyone who:
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an elec-
tronic communication service is provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic com-
munication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section.
' See American Computer Trust Leasing v Jack Farrell Implement Co., 763 F Supp
1473, 1495 (D Minn 1991), aff'd, 967 F2d 1208 (8th Cir 1992) (Although "the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act [ ] bars unlawful access to stored communications," parties
that had consented to another party's access cannot now claim that such access was
unauthorized.).
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threshold for criminal liability.3 State laws reflect a similar fo-
cus.
32
Although legal regulation keyed to system-level boundaries
will not guarantee system security in all circumstances, 3 it does
have several advantages over both the open-system and the indi-
vidual-level boundary models. First, the system administrator is
more likely than the individual users of her system to possess the
technical expertise needed to protect security and privacy effec-
tively. It can also be expected that those technologically-savvy
individuals who present the greatest threat to system security
and user privacy-computer hackers and corporate spies-will
continue to increase their knowledge and enhance their skills
and techniques. The efficient solution to increasing levels of crim-
inal competence would be to place the burden of keeping abreast
of technological developments on a single system administrator,
rather than on each of the many users of her system.
Second, many of the technologies that protect security and
privacy operate most efficiently at the system level. It is more
efficient to monitor a single firewall between the system and the
Internet than it would be to monitor multiple firewalls between
each and every account on the system. A single program monitor-
ing system-wide usage, for example, uses less disk space and
computer time than hundreds of customized programs, each mon-
itoring the activity around a single user's account.
Third, the system-level boundary model provides a clear rule
for courts and criminals alike to use when determining whether a
legal violation has taken place. When an individual is found to
have accessed a system without authorization, the law will hold
her liable. By contrast, adopting the individual-level model would
entail a preliminary determination, by courts and Internet users
alike, of whether an individual user has created a legally protect-
ed boundary around her account or a particular piece of informa-
tion contained therein. An open-system boundary model would, of
course, establish no clear "line" between liability and nonliability;
the court would be required to scrutinize the character of an
3, Pub L No 99-474, 100 Stat 1213, codified at 18 USC § 1030 (1988). Recent amend-
ments to the Act are discussed below. See notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
' See Davis, Note, 72 Wash U L Q at 428-40 (cited in note 28) (discussing state and
federal law and proposing federalizing the law in this area); Anne W. Branscomb, Rogue
Computer Programs and Computer Rogues: Tailoring the Punishment to Fit the Crime, 16
Rutgers Computer & Tech L J 1, 30-44 (1990) (discussing criminal liability under state
statutes).
' For example, authorized users may subvert system security.
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individual's conduct before making a determination as to liabili-
ty.
Nevertheless, adopting a system-level threshold in matters of
both privacy and security ignores the distinct natures of the in-
terests being protected. System security is a goal shared equally
by all users of a particular system. No individual user's interest
in preventing the introduction of computer viruses onto a system
differs qualitatively from any other user's. Respect for system-
level boundaries permits a collective response to this common
threat.
Privacy, on the other hand, is an individual concern, the
demand for which varies from person to person. Some would take
offense at the notion that anyone might try to access their ac-
count. Such people would consider it irrelevant whether an elec-
tronic visitor was merely looking for files of general interest or
attempting to read private correspondence. Other users-perhaps
for the purpose of inviting commerce, perhaps for the purpose of
contributing to the Internet community-would allow limited
access even to their personal files. While e-mail probably would
be off limits, files of general interest might be open for either
unrestricted downloading or purchase. Finally, some users may
not care about privacy at all.
A system-level approach does not recognize this crucial dis-
tinction between privacy and security interests. It simply places a
wall between the system and the Internet. Although this ap-
proach protects the security of all and the privacy of the most
private, it does not respect the interests of those who desire a
more open Internet. The system-level approach places the burden
upon these individuals, whose accounts are made inaccessible to
others as a default rule, to make their information public. Take,
for example, a law student who stores copies of old class outlines
in her account on the school's computer system. If she is more or
less indifferent about whether other students are able to access
these outlines, then our choice of boundary model matters. If we
adopt the individual-level model, under which the user must
affirmatively delineate the boundaries that she wants the law to
protect, then other students will be able to access these outlines.
The same holds true if we adopt the open-system model. If, how-
ever, we adopt the system-level model, then these outlines will,
absent affirmative action on the part of our hypothetical law
student, remain inaccessible to other students; the system ad-
ministrator, by choosing a default rule of privacy, will have di-
minished the supply of information available to members of the
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Internet community when no one had any desire to keep the
outlines out of circulation. Such a default rule, therefore, might
be not only contrary to the communal spirit of the Internet, but
also highly inefficient from a commercial and research perspec-
tive.
When regulating the Internet, legislators, lawyers, and judg-
es should consider which interests they are seeking to advance.
By tailoring solutions to fit particular problems, the law could
encourage the Internet to tailor its defensive mechanisms to be
more responsive to these particular interests.
Four examples illustrate this point. In the first example,
someone acquires unauthorized access to a system and intention-
ally destroys a portion of the programming that runs the system.
In the second example, an authorized user intentionally destroys
another portion of that programming. In the third example, an-
other person acquires unauthorized access to a system and reads
several e-mail files that have been left unprotected by their own-
er.' In the final example, an authorized user reads the same
unprotected e-mail files. The first pair of examples-both of
which would violate current federal laws against computer hack-
ing-clearly implicates the interest in system security; the second
pair implicates the privacy interest of the e-mail owner.
These examples reveal, first of all, that threats to both priva-
cy and security cannot be met entirely at the system's boundary.
An authorized user of a system may disable that system's securi-
ty or violate the privacy rights of other system users as easily as
an unauthorized intruder. In fact, one would expect that serious
threats to privacy come from associates seeking personal infor-
mation about colleagues on a shared system more frequently
than they come from strangers wandering on the Internet. Never-
theless, in the context of system security, the system administra-
tor remains best equipped to deal with both internal and external
threats. Effectively defending both internal and external
firewalls, the task of the system administrator, would have pre-
vented the violations of system integrity in the first and second
examples. The law has good reason, therefore, to recognize sys-
tem-level boundaries in these contexts.
' For example, an individual user of a system operating on UNIX, the most common
system operating software, can take several steps-from simply making her files unread-
able by other users to encrypting those files-to protect her privacy on the Internet. In the
hypothetical, the user has taken no steps to protect her fies, so they may be read by other
authorized users of the system.
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In the context of individual privacy, however, the individual
user is in the best position to take the necessary steps to protect,
or at the very least to request that others respect, her privacy. As
discussed below, the authorized user in the fourth example would
not and should not be deterred from accessing readable files on
her own system. 5 The authorized user simply should not be
punished for reading files that have, for whatever reason, been
left open to users of the system. Absent any notice that these
files, left open to the public, are not intended for public consump-
tion, such punishment would not only be unfair but would also
discourage vigorous use of computer systems. The burden should
be placed on the user who wants privacy to take at least minimal
steps to protect it.
The interesting question is whether the unauthorized user in
the third example should be punished. On one hand, this user
has clearly gained access to the computer system. On the other
hand, the unauthorized user may have accessed files that were
intentionally left accessible by the "victim" with the hope that
they be read and distributed by users of other systems. Whether
or not the unauthorized user should be held liable turns on a
fundamental policy choice that implicates many of the other
interests that this Comment addresses: whether cyberlaw should
seek to protect individual privacy at the expense of promoting the
free flow of information and the full use of the powers of the
Internet. This fundamental issue is best left to the political pro-
cess.
2. Lowering monitoring costs.
The need to monitor the uses made of property might be
another reason to adopt the system-level boundary model. As
Robert Ellickson recently noted, one of the benefits of private
property and its concomitant right to exclude lies in the reduced
costs of monitoring the activities of others: "A key advantage of
individual land ownership is that detecting the presence of a
trespasser is much less demanding than evaluating the conduct
of a person who is privileged to be where he is. Monitoring
boundary crossings is easier than monitoring the behavior of
persons situated inside boundaries." 6
See Section II.C.1.
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L J 1315, 1327-28 (1993).
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This reasoning seems to support the current system-level
approach to boundary definition on the Internet. Monitoring is
necessary to prevent malicious use of a system and to protect the
system against computer viruses. Vis-a-vis individual users, the
system administrator is in the best position to perform the moni-
toring role, and the simplest way to monitor the system is to
regulate access. In short, it is easier to detect an intruder than to
watch the behavior of those already inside.
Although this argument is not without merit, it proves too
much in a world where resource depletion is not a significant
concern. Not every use of a system will damage it. Most uses, in
fact, will have little or no deleterious effect, and quite often such
uses will benefit all parties concerned.
Moreover, the system operator frequently does not know the
identities of her system's users. She may not know the communi-
ties to which they belong or the uses they make of the Internet.
Her governance of the system has little, if anything, to do with
the particular uses those on her system make of the Internet: her
goal is simply to ensure the smooth and efficient use of the sys-
tem. For this reason, her monitoring, while facilitating the effi-
cient use of the system, does little to promote the law's goals of
regulating behavior on the Net as a whole.
Finally, the system administrator is accustomed to making
rules of general applicability. She is not in the business of regu-
lating individual conduct on a case-by-case basis. It would, in
fact, be an extraordinary expansion of the system administrator's
role to require her to monitor such conduct. In the interest of
efficiency and out of a justifiable desire to avoid criminal liability,
the system administrator, if legally assigned a monitoring func-
tion, would likely create system-wide rules that are
overrestrictive. For example, consider a system administrator
confronted with the problem of obscene images being transferred
onto her system. It would be much easier for her to identify files
that contain images than it would be for her to identify those
particular image files containing obscene materials. In order to
be certain that she eliminates the pornographic image files, the
system administrator might prohibit the storing of all image files
on her system so that she will achieve her goal without having to
devote substantial amounts of time to monitoring the contents of
the files stored on her system. She would promulgate an
overinclusive rule in order to promulgate an easily enforceable
rule.
19961
776 The University of Chicago Law Review [63:761
3. The problem of externalities.
One justification for a system of private property is found in
the need to encourage users of scarce resources to internalize the
external costs of their activity." Giving individuals rights of
ownership in particular resources is one way to force them to
internalize such costs:' each owner has incentives to use her resourc-
es efficiently and ensure that others do the same.39
This externalities argument applies both to local computer
systems and to the use of the Internet as a whole.4° Computer
systems have finite computing and storage capacity.4 There will
generally be more than one user on any system. Each user
should be encouraged to use the system in a way that permits
every other user to make efficient use of the system.
At the computer system level, therefore, the externality argu-
ment supports system-level boundary definitions and argues
strongly against the open-system model. The externality argu-
ment most strongly supports system-level rules that regulate the
quantity of use each individual may make of a system. The indi-
vidual determinations of users as to how much use is appropri-
ate-which carry the day in the open-system model-are inade-
quate because they are not based on the capacity of the system
as a whole, but rather on the users' own needs and interests. The
system administrator, by contrast, is in a position to monitor and
regulate according to the effects of individual uses on the system
as a whole.
At the level of the Internet, the externality argument pro-
vides little support for any particular boundary model. There is
almost no conceivable boundary that would, if afforded legal
" The seminal article in this area is Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347 (May 1967). For a general discussion of this idea in the
context of an economic analysis of property rights, see Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 32-38 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1992).
' See Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev at 348 (cited in note 37) ("A primary function of
property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of
externalities.").
Id at 355 ("If a single person owns land, he will attempt to maximize its present
value by taking into account alternative future time streams of benefits and costs and
selecting that one which he believes will maximize the present value of his privately-
owned land rights.").
40 The need to internalize the costs associated with the "use" of information available
on the Internet is discussed in Section II.C.3.
"' By "computing" capacity I mean the power of a computer to run programs, make
calculations, and perform other such functions. By "storage" capacity, I mean the total
quantity of information (files measured in bytes of data) that can be stored in the system's
memory.
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significance, force the thirty million Internet users to internalize
the costs their actions impose on the whole Internet.42 As a
threshold matter, the boundary models that I have proposed
simply would not allow for the level of aggregation that would
render individual activities relevant at the level of the whole
Internet. Moreover, a user is unlikely to view the transfer of a
single document differently, however large that document might
be, depending on whether she is transferring the document in a
world characterized by a system-level, individual-level, or open-
system boundary conception.
Thus, in Cyberspace, the problem of externalities is best
addressed by adopting system-level boundaries. Although no
strategy will solve the problem at the level of the whole Internet,
a strategy that relies on system-level boundaries will at least
ensure that users internalize the costs of their system use. To
address the problem at one level is better, in the final analysis,
than to leave it unchecked at every level.
4. Facilitating coordinated action.
Granting ownership rights to a single person facilitates the
use of a piece of property. In a world of communal ownership, an
individual wishing to use a piece of property would have to get
the permission of all others with a similar claim to it. In a world
of individual ownership, the individual may unilaterally decide to
use the property as she desires.
This aspect of private ownership, when coupled with the
particular expertise of the system administrator, supports the
adoption of the system-level boundary model when technological
actions are at issue. On the vast majority of systems, the system
administrator will have more technological savvy than any of the
system's individual users. She should, therefore, be given a free
hand in making decisions regarding her system's level of tech-
nology and the uses to which it should be put.
Most actions that will be taken on the Internet, however,
will not involve the type of collective action or technological prob-
lems best solved at the system level. This is largely a result of
42 This is true for several reasons. First, the cost of the action of any one individual,
in relation to the Internet as a whole, is unlikely to be significant. Second, it is difficult to
conceive of a system of boundaries that would lead to rules that affect all thirty million
Internet users in the same way. If the Internet is overused, the solution will have to come
from some universal mechanism, perhaps time- or quantity-based user fees that create
the proper incentives to internalize costs.
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the Internet's high level of interconnectivity. Actions taken by a
system administrator may have adverse effects on systems other
than her own. For example, consider a system administrator who
decides to filter out political messages passing through her sys-
tem. This action will impact users-both of the home system and
of all other systems-in two ways. First, users will be cut off
from each other. Users on the home system will not receive polit-
ical information from other systems; they will not contribute to
the political discussions occurring on those systems. Likewise,
users on those other systems will not benefit from the contribu-
tions that would have been made by users of the regulated sys-
tem. Second, rather than providing a conduit for the dissemina-
tion of information, the regulated system will become a filter.
Where, in the past, a message received by the regulated system
would likely have been retransmitted to other users, that mes-
sage will now be deleted. The free flow of information will there-
fore be slowed, to some degree, at the Internet level.
5. The system-based model assessed.
As should now be clear, there are times when the system-
based model should be adopted in Cyberspace. When regulations
deal with technical or technological issues, such as computer
security, or when the system's physical machinery provides the
most sensible unit for regulation, as when regulations aim to
control the use of system hardware, system-level boundaries
make sense. In short, when interests are shared by system users
and are furthered best by regulation at the system level, then
system-level boundaries should be respected.
Nevertheless, the prominence of geographically defined com-
munities in the physical world may be exercising an undue influ-
ence over legal thinking in and about Cyberspace. In the physical
world, communities of interest generally overlap with physical
communities. For example, a town may be predominantly blue-
collar or Catholic or Republican. In these situations, respect for
geographic regions as units of regulation makes sense because it
allows like individuals to be treated alike.
In Cyberspace, system-level boundaries provide a convenient
analogy to these familiar physical boundaries. Assuming that
users of a particular system should be treated alike, however,
often overlooks the unbounded nature of Internet communities.4
' In recent years, the Internet has seen the birth of "virtual communities." In the
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We should not allow preferences formed in a physical world of
physical boundaries to exercise undue influence over our bound-
ary choices in Cyberspace. Although computer systems may offer
a ready analogy to land parcels, our boundary choices in
Cyberspace must not be predetermined; we must consider alter-
native boundary models ready to acknowledge their respective
advantages and disadvantages when compared to system-level
boundaries.
B. Universal Interests and the Open-System Model
1. Protecting the Internet.
Although the battle for system security is generally best
fought at the system level, in some circumstances the law must
address network security, an interest shared by all users of the
Internet, at a universal level. Not every security threat comes
from local computer hackers, and not all hackers limit their at-
tacks to a single system."
The classic example of a global assault on Internet security
and of the inability of the system-level boundary approach to deal
with such threats is the release of the "Internet Worm" by Robert
Tappan Morris. In the fall of 1988, Morris, a graduate student at
Cornell University, discovered several flaws in UNIX, flaws that
would allow him free access to systems across the country.45
Internet environment, where any person can contact any other person with relative ease,
the problem naturally arose of how to communicate with members of one distinct group.
The answer was the creation of idea-based communities on the Net that are differentiated
along lines of common interest. These have taken the form of systems devoted to particu-
lar interests or dispositions. See John Coate, Cyberspace Innkeeping: Building Online
Community, Internet WWW page available at <http'//198.93.154.10/-tex/innkeeping> (ver-
sion current on Jan 11, 1996) (on file with U Chi L Rev). See also Godwin, The Electronic
Frontier Foundation and Virtual Communities (cited in note 16). Usenet newsgroups allow
people interested in particular topics, ranging from philosophy to alternative sexual
practices, to post messages which can then be read by anyone. List servers work by
sending each piece of mail received by the list server to every person who has subscribed
to the service.
In some cases, system-level boundaries might best be disregarded in favor of lines
respecting the interest-based divisions created in Cyberspace. Many users of the Internet
act within communities that are spread over numerous systems, and, frequently, their be-
havior is best regulated within these communities rather than within the confines of their
home systems. For a discussion of community standards in the context of obscenity prose-
cutions, see Edward A. Cavazos and Gavino Morin, Cyberspace and the Law: Your Rights
and Duties in the On-Line World 94-95 (MIT 1994); Godwin, Virtual Community Stan-
dards (cited in note 2).
" See, for example, Schwartz, Chipping in to Curb Computer Crime, Wash Post at Al
(cited in note 2) (discussing the hunt for "computer terrorist" Kevin D. Mitnick, who
allegedly penetrated computer systems around the world).
' For a full discussion of the case, see generally Jonathan Littman, The Shockwave
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Morris then wrote a program, known as a "worm," that would
travel across the Internet and use the holes he had discovered to
gain access to other systems.46
At eight p.m. on November 2, 1988, Morris released the
worm onto the Internet. Before sunrise, the worm had infected
over six thousand computer systems, including those at the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley, the Lawrence Livermore Labo-
ratories, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.47 The total
cost of eradicating the Internet Worm and of lost computing time
has been estimated at $96 million to $1.1 billion."
According to Morris, he did not intend for his program to
damage systems or files. Rather, he designed it to reveal the
security flaws that he had discovered in the programming that
runs most computers linked to the Internet.49 However, the
worm replicated itself at a much faster rate than Morris had anticipat-
ed, infecting many computers repeatedly. ° As more copies be-
gan to run on each system, each system operated at increasingly
slower speeds until, eventually, it either crashed or slowed to the
point of being unusable.5
On appeal from his conviction under the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), 52 Morris argued that the district court
had misinterpreted the statute's intent requirement.53 Relying
Rider, PC/Computing 142 (June 1990).
" See Brett Glass, Dissecting the Internet Worm: How the Program Worked, Infoworld
S9, S9-S10 (Jan 9, 1989). The first and most potent tactic used by the worm was password
cracking, or decrypting password files on various systems. The second attack exploited a
bug in an otherwise friendly system program known as the "finger daemon." The worm
also spread by sending copies of itself to remote locations using a program called
Sendmail.
4 Littman, Shockwave Rider, PC/Computing at 158-68 (cited in note 45).
Branscomb, 16 Rutgers Computer & Tech L J at 6-7 (cited in note 32).
9 United States v Morris, 928 F2d 504, 505-06 (2d Cir 1991).
Morris had programmed the worm to ask each system it encountered whether
there was already a copy of the program running on that system. If it received an answer
of yes, the attacking copy would self-destruct. However, Morris recognized that a pro-
grammer could simply tell a system to answer these queries with a yes, even if no copy of
the program was running. He therefore instructed the program to infect one out of every
seven times that it received a yes response. As it turned out, seven was far too low a
number. Id at 506.
51 Id.
'2 Pub L No 99-474, 100 Stat 1213 (1986), codified at 18 USC § 1030 (1988). For a
discussion of the Morris trial verdict, see John Markoff, Computer Intruder Is Put on
Probation and Fined $10,000, NY Times 1 (May 5, 1990).
5' Morris, 928 F2d at 506-08. At the time, § 1030(a)(5), under which Morris was con-
victed, stated that anyone who:
[63:761
Property in Cyberspace
on the punctuation of § 1030(a)(5), the lower court had concluded
that the intent requirement applied only to the act of accessing
the system, and not to other elements of the crime.' Morris con-
tended that the intent requirement applied to each element of
the offense, requiring not only an intent to access a federal inter-
est computer, but also an intent to "prevent[ ] authorized use" of
the computer.55
The Second Circuit agreed with Morris that punctuation did
not determine the proper interpretation of § 1030(a)(5), but went
on to find that the legislative history supported the district
court's interpretation of the statute's intent requirement." The
court quoted a report of the Senate Judiciary Committee that
concluded that "[t]he substitution of an 'intentional' standard is
designed to focus Federal criminal prosecutions on those whose
conduct evinces a clear intent to enter, without proper authoriza-
tion, computer files or data belonging to another."57 According to
the court, this suggested Congress was principally concerned
with the act of entering the system, not any ensuing damage."
Morris also argued that § 1030(a)(5) did not apply to his
actions because he had not accessed, in the normal sense of the
word, any system for which he had not already obtained authori-
zation.59 He was authorized to use the computers at Cornell,
Harvard, and Berkeley, from which he launched his program. He
was authorized, on those systems, to use Sendmail and finger
daemon, the features via which his worm gained access to other
systems. Morris argued, therefore, that he had at most exceeded
his authorized access on those systems, but had not gained "un-
authorized access."" The court rejected this argument:
(5) intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without authorization, and
by means of one or more instances of such conduct alters, damages, or destroys infor-
mation in any such Federal interest computer, or prevents authorized use of any
such computer or information, and thereby -
(A) causes loss to one or more others of a value aggregating $1,000 or more
during any one year period; ...
shall be punished as provided ....
' In particular, the court relied on the comma between "authorization" and "and."
Morris, 928 F2d at 507. See text of statutory provision in note 53.
Morris, 928 F2d at 507.
Id at 507-09.
, Id at 508, quoting Fraud and Abuse Act, S Rep No 99-432, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 6
(1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 2479, 2484 (emphasis added).
8 Morris, 928 F2d at 509.
9 Id.
60 Id at 509-10.
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While a case might arise where the use of SEND MAIL or
finger demon falls within a nebulous area in which the line
between accessing without authorization and exceeding
authorized access may not be clear, Morris's conduct here
falls well within the area of unauthorized access. Morris did
not use either of those features in any way related to their
intended function. He did not send or read mail nor discover
information about other users; instead he found holes in
both programs that permitted him a special and unautho-
rized access route into other computers.'
The Morris case caused considerable controversy in the legal
and computer communities.62 The source of this controversy is
the statute under which Morris was prosecuted, the CFAA, which
focuses on system-level boundaries. 63 In upholding Morris's con-
viction, the Second Circuit concluded that the intent requirement
applied only to accessing a computer system without authoriza-
tion. So long as the access is intentional, it does not matter that
the damage is inadvertent. In other words, the mens rea require-
ment of the CFAA is applied to the potentially benign act of ac-
cessing a system, rather than to the acts that would actually
harm the system or the accounts of its users.
Legal commentators have noted the difficulty of prosecuting
the creators of computer viruses under the CFAA, 64 and Con-
gress recently responded by eliminating § 1030(a)(5)'s system-
level focus and de-emphasizing the unauthorized-access require-
ment of the old statute.65 Section 1030(a)(5) now focuses on the
61 Id at 510.
' The arguments for and against punishing Morris are thoroughly discussed in
Brenda Nelson, Note, Straining the Capacity of the Law: The Idea of Computer Crime in
the Age of the Computer Worm, 11 ComputeriL J 299, 305-19 (1991).
See note 31 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Leahy, 5 Harv J L & Tech at 22 (cited in note 2) ("[Als demon-
strated by several recent computer abuse incidents, the most severe forms of computer
damage are often inflicted on remote computers to which the violator never gained 'access'
in the commonly understood sense of that term."); Davis, Note, 72 Wash U L Q at 426
(cited in note 28) (While a cause of action brought under the CFAA requires proof of
intentional unauthorized access to a computer, most malevolent software creators intend
to access only a single computer.); Susan C. Lyman, Note, Civil Remedies for the Victims
of Computer Viruses, 11 Computer/L J 607, 609 (1992) (noting that the CFAA lacks
specific statutory language that would facilitate convictions for computer virus offenses).
6 18 USC § 1030(a)(5) (1994), as amended by the Computer Abuse Amendments Act
of 1994, Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 2097, now imposes liability upon those who knowing-
ly cause the transmission of "a program, information, code, or command" that causes
damages in excess of $1,000 (or interferes with medical care or treatment) if the person
intended to cause damage or acted with reckless disregard of the risk of damage.
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act of transmitting malicious code, an act the perpetrator need
only knowingly perform.66 Those who intend to cause damage
and who knowingly transmit malicious code may be fined and
imprisoned for up to ten years. 7 Likewise, those who transmit a
virus with "reckless disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk" that the transmission will cause damage may be fined and
imprisoned for up to one year.68
The congressional revision of the CFAA seems wise. Under
the old statute, the focus of a prosecution was on the perpe-
trator's intent to violate a system-level boundary. Such reliance
on system-level boundaries resulted in prosecutions, like the
Morris case, that focused not upon the resulting harm or the
actions that proximately caused that harm but upon an action
frequently incidental to causing harm. The transmission of the
virus is now the actus reus. The severity of the punishment,
quite logically, turns on the defendant's intent with respect to
bringing about the harm.
More importantly for purposes of this Comment, the amend-
ment also recognizes that such harms frequently do not occur at
the system level or even within systems. For example, a virus
could be designed to clog the Internet itself, cutting off communi-
cations between systems and individual users. The old statute,
with its threshold requirement of unauthorized access of a partic-
ular system, could not have reached these crimes. The new stat-
ute remedies this inadequacy by recognizing damage to networks,
individual computers, programs, and files as a basis of liability.
The law has grown to recognize both that individually estab-
lished boundaries can be violated and that the network as a
whole may form the proper level at which to conduct legal analy-
sis.
The Morris case revealed the inadequacy of statutory
schemes that blindly accept system-level boundaries as an exclu-
sive regulatory baseline. However, neither Congress nor the
courts have consistently applied the lesson of Morris. The CFAA,
to provide just one example, still relies on unauthorized access in
all of its other provisions. 61 Under the system-level approach
"Damage" includes denying access to or use of a computer or system. 18 USC §
1030(a)(5)(iXII).
18 USC § 1030(a)(5)(A)-(B).
18 USC § 1030(c)(3)(A)-(B) (1994), as amended by the Computer Abuse Amend-
ments Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 2097.
18 USC § 1030(c)(4) (1994).
6 18 USC § 1030(a)(1)-(4) (1994), as amended by the Computer Abuse Amendments
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exemplified by Morris, courts were-and, in other contexts, will
be-forced to look to incidental behavior when determining liabil-
ity. The open-system conception, now partly adopted in the
CFAA, will allow courts to consider the damaging behavior at
which the law should aim when determining liability.
When evidence of behavior and damage is difficult to obtain,
legal reliance on system-level boundaries makes sense. For exam-
ple, under some circumstances, it may be impossible to show that
someone has read a sensitive file on a system. In this situation,
imposing liability on a trespasser who has crossed a system
boundary will make sense.
In a case like Morris, however, basing liability for a distinct
act-be it reading electronic mail, spreading a virus, tampering
with system software, or deleting valuable fies-on the act of
crossing a system boundary makes for a system of regulation
that takes no account of either the activities it aims to regulate
or the level of regulation appropriate to each of these distinct
activities. The open-boundary model will allow for a system of
tailored regulation on the Internet.
2. Protecting scarce resources.
The social cost of resource depletion is one externality that a
system of private ownership should force owners to internalize.70
A problem, sometimes referred to as the "tragedy of the com-
mons," results when a person has unrestricted use of a communal
resource.71 In the absence of legal rules, that person can be ex-
pected to deplete the resource to the point of exhaustion without
considering either the desires of others or the potential needs of
future generations.
This problem, however, does not exist with informational
resources.72 Copying a fie, unlike pasturing animals or hunting
Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 2097 provides liability for whoever:
(1) knowingly accesses a computer without authorization... ;
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization...;
(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any computer.., accesses such a
computer... ;
(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a Federal interest computer ....
7' See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243
(1968).
71 Id at 1244.




beaver, does not deplete the resource.73 As others have noted,
copying a file actually doubles the quantity of that resource.74
With respect to informational resources, then, the existence of
any legal boundaries will decrease the potential availability of
informational resources on the Internet.
Courts and legislatures should not fashion rules or recognize
boundaries that prohibit the dissemination of documents intend-
ed for distribution. In such situations, the open-system model is
clearly most appropriate because it will facilitate the free flow of
this informational commerce.
3. Ensuring development of the Internet.
Unblinking observance of system-level boundaries will stunt
the development of the Internet itself. The more that individuals
are encouraged to think in terms of their own systems, the less
inclined they will be to think of the Internet as a whole. Con-
versely, a system of legal rules that respects, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, boundaries other than at the system level will be
more likely to encourage the technological development of the
Internet.
For example, a shift away from reliance on system-level
boundaries and toward the open boundary model would create
incentives for developing technologies that could overcome many
of the collective action problems on the Internet. A system linked
to the Internet is only as secure as the most insecure system to
which it grants access. If, however, the law shifted its focus from
individual systems to the Internet as a whole, all users would
have incentives to develop universal solutions to the problems of
Internet security. A single intelligent network could perform
many of the functions now being served by the countless firewalls
that protect individual systems.75
73 See Hardin, 162 Science at 1243 (cited in note 70) (pasturing animals); Demsetz,
57 Am Econ Rev at 351-53 (cited in note 37) (hunting beaver).
"' See John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the
Global Net, Internet WWW page available at <http'/www.eff.org/pub/Publications/John_
PerryBarlow/HTMIJidea-economy-article.html> (version current on Jan 11, 1996) (on file
with U Chi L Rev) ('The central economic distinction between information and physical
property is the ability of information to be transferred without leaving the possession of
the original owner. If I sell you my horse, I can't ride him after that. If I sell you what I
know, we both know it."). Admittedly, this argument assumes a world of preexisting
resources on the network. The need to preserve incentives to produce is discussed in
Section II.C.3.
" For a fuller discussion of the current trend toward developing a "smart network,"
see generally Andy Reinhardt, The Network With Smarts: New Agent-based WANs Presage
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A regulatory system that relied on system-level boundaries
would also tend to produce legal rules that would hold system
administrators liable for the actions of individuals over whom
system administrators exercise little, if any, real control. For
example, a Florida bulletin board service recently lost a copyright
infringement case involving pictures that users had uploaded to
the system.76 The system operator was unaware that the pic-
tures were on his bulletin board, much less that they were copy-
righted.77 A similar result was obtained in a case involving up-
loaded copies of video games. 8 Government law enforcement
activity, moreover, has often been arbitrary, excessive, and, in
perhaps one case, a violation of the civil rights of a bulletin board
operator. 79 The result has been confusion among bulletin board
operators and a general sense of fear in the Cyberspace commu-
nity.80
This fear has not been confined to operators of bulletin
boards. Recently, Carnegie Mellon University decided to restrict
access to Net sites where pornographic images are available.8
Other universities are likely to follow suit.82 Thus, the result of
legal rules that impose liability at the system level is not difficult
to predict. If a university faces civil or criminal liability for mate-
rials placed onto its system by a user without its knowledge, it
will craft increasingly stringent rules to prevent users from gain-
ing access to those materials. Such restrictions will hobble the
Internet as a common resource.
the Future of Connected Computing, Byte 51 (Oct 1994).
76 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v Frena, 839 F Supp 1552, 1554-59 (M D Fla 1993).
Id at 1554.
78 Sega Enterprises Ltd. v Maphia, 857 F Supp 679, 682-84, 686-88 (N D Cal 1994).
But see United States v LaMacchia, 871 F Supp 535, 540-45 (D Mass 1994) (holding that
person who set up a bulletin board for the distribution of copyrighted software did not
violate the wire fraud statute).
71 See, for example, Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v United States Secret Service, 36 F3d
457, 459 (5th Cir 1994), in which seizure of bulletin board system computer, coupled with
reading and deleting the e-mail on the system, was held to violate the Privacy Protection
Act of 1980, 42 USC §§ 2000aa et seq (1988). For a discussion of the Steve Jackson Games
case and the Secret Service sting operation of which it was a part, see generally Barlow,
Crime and Puzzlement (cited in note 2); Ric Manning, Feds pull plug on Louisville bulletin
board, Louisville Courier-Journal E5 (Oct 16, 1994).
o See generally Manning, Courier-Journal E5 (cited in note 79).
8' George McLaren, Colleges begin to limit access to pornography on computer sys-
tems, Indianapolis Star D1 (Jan 1, 1995). Carnegie Mellon University restricted access to
several bulletin board services as well as Usenet newsgroups that carry sexually explicit
images. On the decision, Erwin Steinberg, Vice Provost for Education at Carnegie Mellon,




Adopting the open-system model as the basis for apportion-
ing responsibility and liability would, by contrast, tend to open
up the Internet. Consider a university president who must decide
whether to provide local high schools with access to the universi-
ty computer system. A system-level model would force the univer-
sity president to say no to the schools' request; she could not risk
subjecting the university to liability not only for the actions tak-
en by the children on the Internet but also for any harms-pedo-
philia and child pornography spring quickly to mind-that might
come to the children as a result of their contact with the
Internet. Under an open-system model, however, expanding the
scope of service provided would not expand one's exposure to
liability. Liability would be imposed on those directly responsible
for the harms being regulated-in this case, those individuals
who placed the child pornography on the Internet or who con-
tacted children for reasons in no sense benign. Our hypothetical
university president, therefore, would find no grounds for hesita-
tion in the legal rules that would evolve under the open-system
model.
4. The problems of allocation and access.
As described above, the Net was born out of a desire to allow
scientists at different locations to share the use of powerful com-
puters at other locations.83 This use is no longer a dominant fea-
ture of the Internet. Most current users do not need access to
computer power in the way advanced researchers in the sciences
do. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the potentially negative
effects that the system-level boundary model could have on the
future development of a nationwide base of computer power."
Computer time is a limited resource, and an operable com-
puter that is unused or underused is a wasted resource. The law
should take account of this problem when developing its baseline
rules for the Internet; we must recognize, at every step in the
evolution of a law of Cyberspace, that the more permeable sys-
tem boundaries become, the more those who need to will cross
83 See text accompanying note 12.
Guaranteeing access to the Internet is an issue of increasing concern. See note 87
and accompanying text. If Net access were extended to secondary schools and other lower
level educational institutions, then the benefits of accessible computer power would
become more pronounced. Although secondary school students have little to offer immedi-
ately in return for the information and computer resources they might use, the long-term
societal benefits of allowing them access to information and computer resources are
apparent.
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those boundaries and make use of those systems. Legal rules
could, for example, encourage users to more efficiently allocate
computer time, shifting operations from systems that are over-
used at certain hours to systems that are underused at those
times.
The same argument applies to the use of computer memory.
A computer system with substantially more memory than its
users require could be used to store information for others, per-
haps by creating a duplicate "FTP site" for anonymous down-
loading.8" Such an arrangement would facilitate information
distribution without any serious impairment to the owner of the
underused system.86 Thus, a system of open boundaries would
facilitate efficient allocation of computer power by permitting
computer users on overused systems to execute applications and
store data on underused systems.
Finally, as the Internet continues to develop, not only as a
commercial mechanism but also as an educational resource and
communications medium, it will become increasingly desirable to
ensure that the underprivileged gain access.87 Thus, legislatures
and courts should consider whether the legal rules they devise
will likely result in a more open system, to which such groups
will be able to gain access, or a more closed system, from which
those lacking financial and technological resources will be exclud-
ed. The example of the university president again comes to mind.
The law should create rules that will, at the very least, not at-
tach potential liability to altruistic behavior. In short, if our hy-
pothetical university president wishes to provide Internet links to
' An FTP-or, "File Transfer Protocol"-site is a location on the Internet at which a
certain amount of computer memory has been dedicated to storing files. At many such
sites, no restrictions are placed on downloading these fies. They are free to all comers.
This potential has been recognized by at least one group of Internet users: comput-
er hackers. One particularly audacious group used the computers of the Lawrence
Livermore facility to store a collection of obscene images. See The Case of the Internet
Mole: Livermore finds itself the repository of a most unwanted photo collection, LA Times
A10, A10 (July 13, 1994).
The problem of ensuring that underprivileged groups will have access to the
Internet is discussed in Alison Gardy, Forging Links Between Inner Cities and the
Internet, NY Times Section 3 at 10 (Mar 12, 1995) (noting that less than 40 percent of
black students have access to computers, compared to 60 percent of white students). For
analyses of access as a First Amendment question, compare Cass R. Sunstein, The First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 Yale L J 1757, 1762, 1774, 1792-94 (1995) (arguing that
the First Amendment would not prohibit government regulation designed to ensure
access), with Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infra-
structure, 30 Wake Forest L Rev 1, 18-19, 36-50 (1995) (arguing that government regula-
tion to ensure access would violate the First Amendment).
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underprivileged high school children, the law should not discour-
age her from doing so.
5. The open-system model assessed.
When confronted with Internet-wide problems that are best
dealt with at the Internet-wide level, the law should adopt rules
that govern without creating or recognizing any boundaries in
Cyberspace. Protecting the programming and hardware that run
the Internet offers the clearest example of an Internet-wide prob-
lem that is best addressed by legal rules that rely on behavior
instead of boundaries. Legal rules that are tied to system-level
boundaries will be eluded by the computer viruses and Internet
worms that know no limitations from these firewalls and system
boundaries.
The open-system model also allows the law to encourage
certain behavior on a network-wide level. First, by not recogniz-
ing boundaries, the law could facilitate the free flow of informa-
tion. As far as commerce is concerned, boundaries are synony-
mous with obstacles and should be disfavored at law. Second, by
recognizing the Internet as an open system, the law would en-
courage individuals to think about and develop the Internet as a
single system. Whenever problems are best addressed at the
Internet level--computer viruses represent one example; improv-
ing transmission efficiencies another-the law would do well to
encourage individuals to develop solutions that can be imple-
mented once at the Internet level rather than countless times at
the system level. Finally, boundaries serve only to hinder the
sharing of resources on the Internet; a user on one system who
wishes to use another, underused computer system will be able to
do so more easily if faced with fewer access boundaries.
C. Individual Interests and the Individual-Level Boundary
Model
We have now considered how the law, by relying on the sys-
tem-level model, can promote interests common to all users of
particular systems, and how, by relying on the open-system mod-
el, it can promote the interests of the whole Internet. We now
turn to consider the interests of the individual user, and when,
by affording legal protection to each user's choices, the law can
create solutions that are both efficient and respectful of each
user's autonomy.
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1. Minimizing transaction costs in commercial contexts.
Under the current legal regime, owners of information must
take affirmative steps if they want to make their information
accessible to others on the Internet. Given that would-be users
will not be able to gain legal access, the existence of largely im-
permeable system-level boundaries ensures that information will
remain effectively nonexistent as long as users keep that infor-
mation in their individual accounts.
One might dispute the existence of a problem here. If the
owner of a file wishes that file to be available to others, she can,
after all, place it into the stream of commerce. The fact that she
has not done so, then, should indicate that she has made a judg-
ment that the file is not commercially valuable or is valuable
only if kept out of the stream of commerce.
The premises of this objection, however, are flawed. First,
one ought not to assume that a file owner's inaction indicates
such reasoned calculation. The failure to act may reflect no more
than indifference or a misconception about the value of the file.
Second, the objection relies on a formalistic notion of com-
merce that may be inappropriate in the context of Cyberspace.
The division between commercial and private domains, which can
be drawn with a comparatively high degree of clarity in the real
world, blurs in Cyberspace. There are, at present, no specialized
commercial zones or distribution agents on the Internet. More-
over, in the physical world, there is a genuine need for these
distributional systems-railroads, barges, and trucks for trans-
porting goods; wholesale and resale outlets from which the goods
will be sold; advertising agencies and salesmen to provide con-
sumers with product information-which might be both superflu-
ous and inefficient on the Internet. Given both the high level of
interconnectivity on the Net and the ease of conducting transac-
tions without intermediate actors, there is no reason to think
that there is a need for a uniquely commercial area on the Net.
Third, the high degree of interconnectivity on the Internet
calls into question the feasibility of traditional notification
tools-the virtual equivalents, as they are developed, of blanket
advertising on television or through printed media. It is difficult
to tailor a notice to reach only a certain segment of the Internet
since the population of Cyberspace is not yet commercially differ-
entiated. Attempts to reach a particular group will, as a result,
often reach a substantially larger audience. If the law creates
incentives for information providers to send messages advertising
their availability, the result will be a mindless cacophony of ad-
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vertising that reaches everyone but informs no one.8" Therefore,
an open-system model of Internet commerce would, in all likeli-
hood, prove unworkable.
Finally, were the law to adopt a system-level model when
regulating commercial matters, it would shift to the system ad-
ministrator the task of determining what search costs would
have to be expended prior to the formation of contracts of sale.
The administrator would determine the extent to which outsiders
could learn about users on her system, and, thereby, the extent
to which outsiders could acquire knowledge about potential part-
ners in commerce. Thus, a third party would control the extent to
which communication between information seekers and informa-
tion producers on a given system will ever occur. However, the
system administrator is particularly ill suited for making these
determinations. Generally, system administrators are chosen for
their computer expertise. They are familiar with computer sys-
tems and security, not with the nature of the business that users
of their systems conduct. From an informational standpoint,
system administrators are the parties least able to determine
whether a transaction should, or is likely to, take place between
an information producer and the information seeker. They are
also in a poor position to set the efficient level of search costs for
transactions on the Internet. Nevertheless, under the system-
' There are several reasons for believing that this model of providing notice would be
inefficient. First, there is currently no way to reach a large passive audience without over-
running not only the ability of the network to transmit data but also the ability of individ-
uals to sort through and process the large volume of information they would receive. One
company has tried such a saturation approach. The Phoenix law firm of Cantor & Siegel
posted a short message to every Usenet newsgroup advertising the services the firm
provided. The Internet community was not sympathetic to this saturation of the informa-
tion marketplace. The firm received such a large amount of "hate" e-mail that the comput-
er company that provided its Internet link experienced fifteen computer crashes. See
Peter H. Lewis, An Ad (Gasp!) in Cyberspace: Lawyer's Message vs. Netiquette, NY Times
D1, DI (Apr 19, 1994).
Second, even if an information producer takes an active role in providing notice that
she now possesses information that may be commercially valuable, it will still be neces-
sary for the consumer to take active steps in order to receive notice of desired information
products. See Internet Advertising: Ethics and Etiquette, Online Libraries and Microcom-
puters (Information Intelligence, Inc., Phoenix, Ariz) (June 1994) ("This type of service
[one that provides a location on the Internet that is dedicated to commercial information]
is typically considered good etiquette because it is not barraging thousands of unsuspect-
ing users with electronic Junk mail' but is providing a place where interested persons can
come to electronically 'window shop'."). Requiring producers to put their information into
circulation, in short, does nothing to facilitate the task of finding that information; it only
creates an additional step in the preliminaries to commercial transactions.
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level boundary model, these administrators have the power to set
the rules that will determine the likelihood of such transactions.
It is too early in the course of the Internet's development to
make judgments about the superiority of one method of com-
merce over another or predictions about which mode will prevail.
However, it is also too early to foreclose, through the rigid appli-
cation of legal rules, the possibility that a nontraditional system
of exchange will, in fact, prove the most efficient. In the case of
Internet commerce, a system of regulation that respects bound-
aries defined by individual users appears preferable to either the
open-system or the now dominant system-level boundary models.
Individuals are, first and foremost, best positioned to determine
the value of information in their possession. This being the case,
the law should adopt rules that will respect individual choices
regarding how the information they own is to be disposed of
commercially.
2. Protecting freedom of expression.
This Section first evaluates the effect of traditional notions of
private property and boundary definition on freedom of speech in
Cyberspace and then proceeds to argue that the individual-level
boundary model is best suited to protecting this interest.89
While at first glance this connection may seem somewhat attenu-
ated, closer examination reveals that the degree to which legal
significance is afforded system-level boundaries will likely deter-
mine who bears the responsibility for what is said on the
Internet.
Boundaries create units for monitoring the activities of oth-
ers. As Professor Ellickson has observed, this is particularly
efficient when the monitor is charged only with excluding those
not authorized to enter."0 However, when the state recognizes
and protects property rights, the law also tends to place respon-
sibility for the actions of others upon the monitor. The right to
exclusive use, it seems, brings with it a duty to ensure that prop-
erty is used in a way that is acceptable to the state.9
' There is a growing body of literature on other aspects of the First Amendment in
Cyberspace. See generally, Sunstein, 104 Yale L J 1757 (cited in note 87); Philip H.
Miller, Note, New Technology, Old Problem: Determining the First Amendment Status of
Electronic Information Services, 61 Fordham L Rev 1147 (1993); Cate, 30 Wake Forest L
Rev 1 (cited in note 87).
'o Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1327-28 (cited in note 36).
, See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367, 388-92 (1969) (Holder of
broadcast license may be forced to give "equal time" to opposing viewpoints.).
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In Cubby, Inc. v CompuServe Inc., a federal district court
considered whether a national computer bulletin board service
should be held liable for failing to perform this type of monitor-
ing role.92 CompuServe provides subscribers with access to thou-
sands of online information services, including 150 special inter-
est forums, interactive online conferences, and topical databas-
es.93 Someone posted an article onto one of these services that
allegedly defamed a competing bulletin board service operated by
Cubby.94 Although management of the service to which the arti-
cle was posted was the responsibility of another firm, Cubby
brought an action for libel against CompuServe. 5 CompuServe
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, first, it had
acted as a distributor, not a publisher, of the statements; and,
second, as a distributor, it could not be held liable for the state-
ments because it did not know and had no reason to know of
their content.
In granting CompuServe's motion for summary judgment,
the court first determined that CompuServe was a distributor of
information, similar to a library or bookseller, rather than a
publisher of information. 7 Extrapolating from the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith v California," the Cubby court refused
to impose liability on an information distributor unless that dis-
tributor knew or had reason to know of the material's defamatory
nature.99
Although it grounded its decision in First Amendment juris-
prudence, the Cubby court was well aware of the novel technolog-
ical context to which it was applying the First Amendment:
9 776 F Supp 135, 137-38 (S D NY 1991). For a discussion of the decision, see gener-
ally Terri A. Cutrera, Computer Networks, Libel, and the First Amendment, 11 Comput-
er/L J 555 (1992).
Cubby, 776 F Supp at 137.
Id at 138. The allegedly defamatory remarks included a suggestion that individuals
at the Cubby service gained access to information first published by CompuServe through
"some back door," a statement that a Cubby official was "bounced" from his previous em-
ployer, and a description of the Cubby service as a "new start-up scam." Id.
' Id at 137. CompuServe is primarily an access provider and does not create or
maintain most of the services to which it provides access. Id at 138.
Id at 138.
Id at 140 (CompuServe's product is "in essence an electronic, for-profit library that
carries a vast number of publications and collects usage and membership fees from its
subscribers in return for access to the publications.").
361 US 147, 152-53 (1959) (Ordinance imposing strict liability on booksellers for
selling obscene materials violated constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press.).
" 776 F Supp at 139-41.
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Technology is rapidly transforming the information industry.
A computerized database is the functional equivalent of a
more traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent applica-
tion of a lower standard of liability to an electronic news
distributor such as CompuServe than that which is applied
to a public library, book store, or newsstand would impose
an undue burden on the free flow of information.' 0
After acknowledging the difficulties inherent in monitoring all of
the publications carried by the service, the court held that the
First Amendment protected CompuServe even in the absence of
any effort to perform such monitoring:
[Iit would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine
every publication it carries for potentially defamatory state-
ments than it would be for any other distributor to do so.
"First Amendment guarantees have long been recognized as
protecting distributors of publications .... Obviously, the
national distributor of hundreds of periodicals has no duty to
monitor each issue of every periodical it distributes. Such a
rule would be an impermissible burden on the First Amend-
ment."'0 '
The Cubby decision raises the possibility that, even if the
law recognizes system-level boundaries, the First Amendment
might forbid assigning monitoring fimchions to the owners of
computer systems. Any legislative or legal attempt to require
systems linked to the Internet to monitor the information flowing
into or out of their systems would raise the First Amendment
issues addressed in Smith and Cubby. The courts may still re-
spect system-owners' rights-for example, the right to exclude
certain individuals from the system or to prohibit certain behav-
ior on the system-but they should not automatically assign
liability to system owners for actions taken on the system. For
example, under the conception proposed in this Comment, a sys-
tem owner could still prohibit storing obscene images on her
system and could exclude those individuals who had done so from
the system; nevertheless, system owners who chose not to regu-
late their systems or whose attempts at regulation failed would
not be held liable. The net benefit to society of having additional
' Id at 140-41.




systems contributing to free and unfettered debate on the
Internet outweighs, I believe, the risks of not legally requiring
private monitoring of the activities taking place on those sys-
tems.
The Cubby court's decision not to assign a monitoring func-
tion to system administrators also seems correct as a matter of
boundary definition. As in the commercial context, the informa-
tion producer is the person best suited to judge the import of its
content and should accordingly bear the responsibility for its
dissemination. In the context of regulating the content of speech,
therefore, the boundary line should be drawn at the level of the
individual, not the system.
The reach of the Cubby decision, however, remains unclear.
The First Amendment has not prevented other district courts
from applying strict liability to bulletin board operators where
copyrighted material was found on their bulletin boards."2 In
1994, a California couple was convicted of distributing obscene
materials for operating an adult-oriented bulletin board service
out of their home.' °3 Most recently, Congress amended the Com-
munications Act of 1934 to regulate the transmission of porno-
graphic images and messages on the Internet.1°4 The Act as
amended imposes criminal liability on any system operator who
"knowingly permits" his system to be used for the transmission
or posting of prohibited materials.' 5 In so doing, it assigns lia-
, See, for example, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v Frena, 839 F Supp 1552, 1554-59 (M
D Fla 1993).
" See United States v Thomas, 74 F3d 701 (6th Cir 1996) (affirming conviction). A
Tennessee postal inspector became a member of the service and proceeded to download
sexually explicit images, order a sexually explicit videotape (which was delivered to him
via UPS), and send the couple operating the service an unsolicited child-porn video. The
couple was tried before a jury that applied the community standards of Memphis, Tennes-
see, and convicted on ten counts of obscenity related to the downloaded photographs.
Godwin, Virtual Community Standards (cited in note 2).
... The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, to be codified
in relevant part at 47 USC § 223(a). For a full draft of the Act, see Conference Report on
S 652, Telecommunications Act of 1996, 142 Cong Rec H1078, H1099 (Jan 31, 1996). The
new law criminalizes knowingly initiating the transmission of any "comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, or indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person."
" The Act amends 47 USC § 223(aX2) to provide that anyone who:
knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for [a
prohibited activity] with the intent that it be used for such an activity [] shall be
fined... or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
110 Stat at 133.
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bility in a way that will likely discourage the openness that cur-
rently characterizes the Net, and may ultimately have a severe
chilling effect on both commerce and free speech in Cyberspace.
If the system administrator is civilly or criminally liable for any-
thing that the users of her system do or say, then she is likely to
create restrictions designed to insulate herself from such liability.
These restrictions will produce results inimical to First Amend-
ment values.1 6 The Supreme Court has recognized the dangers
of such a chilling effect in other First Amendment contexts."7
Whether courts will acknowledge the chilling effect in Cyberspace
remains to be seen.'
The chilling effect of overly restrictive liability rules poses as
large a threat to First Amendment values in Cyberspace as it
does in other contexts. Courts should avoid this threat by defin-
ing the relevant boundaries in the context of content regula-
tion-as the Cubby court did in the context of libel law-at the
level of the individual responsible for disseminating the materials
in question.
3. Protecting incentives to produce.
The analysis of the "tragedy of the commons" in the discus-
sion of the open-system model"° assumed a world of preexisting
resources. This Section starts from a different baseline; it consid-
ers the effect of Internet boundary rules on the behavior of the
those who produce information resources.
"0 See Jonathan Gilbert, Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for User
Misuse, 54 Fordham L Rev 439, 447 (1985) (discussing the possibility that system opera-
tors might censor legitimate messages on controversial subjects in order to avoid legal
liability).
" See, for example, Smith, 361 US at 152-53 (striking down a California ordinance
imposing strict liability on a bookseller who possessed any book determined to be ob-
scene).
"os Consider, for example, the possible chilling effects of the adult-oriented bulletin
board cases discussed in note 103 and accompanying text. For discussions of the liability
of bulletin board operators for messages they transmit, see generally Gilbert, Note, 54
Fordham L Rev 439 (cited in note 106); Loftus E. Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer
Bulletin Board Operators for Defamation Posted by Others, 22 Conn L Rev 203 (1989);
David Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems and System
Operator Liability, 12 Computer/L J 101 (1993). The particular case of bulletin board
operator liability is distinguishable from the case of system administrator liability in the
present context. Bulletin boards are generally limited in size. Monitoring costs may still
be high, see Gilbert, Note, 54 Fordham L Rev at 447-48, but the cost of monitoring the
limited number of messages on a bulletin board would be much less than that of monitor-
ing all activity occurring on an entire system.
1" See Section II.B.2.
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The argument regarding incentives to produce is fairly sim-
ple. An author, or any other producer of an information resource,
will not be inclined to produce information if she cannot control
or profit from its dissemination."'
One could argue that system-level boundaries would preserve
incentives to produce by protecting property placed on the Net.
Access to a system can be controlled, and only those interested in
acquiring information stored on a system would be allowed to
enter. Such control would protect a producer's interests in the
property she has created and, thereby, preserve incentives to
produce information.
The individual-level boundary model, however, is better
suited to protecting an individual's property interests in her
information and, thereby, her ex ante incentives to produce that
resource. This is true at two levels: the psychological and the
legal. At the psychological level, the owner of a piece of informa-
tion will feel more secure in her possession of that information if
she is able to consciously determine the level of legal protection
that it will receive. She will feel more secure, in other words, if
she knows that when she performs certain actions-for example,
marking a file as unreadable or encrypting a file-she is calling
upon the law to protect her. At the legal level, the law could
make these significant actions triggers of legal protection. For
example, the law could criminalize all attempts to override the
encryption used by individuals to protect their files or to read
files that have otherwise been designated unreadable.
All of the arguments for system-level and individual-level
boundaries, however, assume that it is the theft, or the unautho-
rized downloading of a file, that destroys that file's value. In
Cyberspace, however, a single theft, in itself, neither removes the
information from the possession of its owner nor radically dimin-
ishes its value. A theft, with no more, results only in the loss to
the producer of one potential customer, and therefore in the vast
majority of cases the resulting loss in value would be negligi-
ble.'1 '
The real loss in value in Cyberspace results from the wide-
spread dissemination of a resource."' This problem is particu-
110 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 38 (cited in note 37).
, I do not address cases in which the value of information depends on absolute confi-
dentiality. Although commercial, such information is not intended for commerce. This type
of information-for example, corporate secrets-would best be considered under the pri-
vacy analysis outlined in Section IIA.L.
112 Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles (cited in note 74):
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larly severe in the highly interconnected medium of the Internet,
where a piece of information can be sent effortlessly around the
globe within seconds and disseminated to hundreds of locations
within minutes." Moreover, because a purchaser of informa-
tion can disseminate that information as easily as a thief, pre-
venting theft will have only a marginal impact on preventing
dissemination.
The solution to this problem remains elusive. What should
be clear, however, is that the system-level model does little, if
anything, to protect an owner's interest in exclusive control over
the information she possesses. While enforceable system-level
boundaries may protect owners of information resources from
persons outside the system, they do nothing to protect against
predators already inside the system. This defenselessness against
"internal" predators increases in significance when one considers
that it is persons relatively close to a creator who are more likely
to know about and profit from stored intellectual property."'
Protection for such interests is better found either at the individ-
ual level, perhaps by the use of encryption tools to conceal and
copyprotect valuable commercial information, " or at the level
of the Internet as a whole, perhaps by implementing protocols for
tracing the source and destination of particular files. Legal rules
designed to protect incentives to produce by drawing boundaries
at the system level will most likely slow the development of tech-
nologies that aim at affording non-boundary-based methods of
protection in Cyberspace.
4. The individual-level model assessed.
When individual choice, initiative, or innovation are desir-
able, particularly in the commercial context, the law should adopt
an individual-level model of Internet regulation. Regulations
The riddle is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced and instantaneously
distributed all over the planet without cost .... how can we protect it? How are we
going to get paid for the work we do with our minds? And, if we can't get paid, what
will assure the continued creation and distribution of such work?
113 See text accompanying notes 17-18.
.. See text accompanying notes 34-35.
. Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles (cited in note 74). Barlow suggests encrypting
files to prevent their theft or duplication. This is one possible option, but, in my opinion,
any network-based solution to these sorts of problems would be better than either individ-
ual or system-level monitoring. The efficiency of having one monitor rather than hundreds
or millions of monitors is obvious. The downside to this approach, however, is the risk
associated with putting all of our security eggs into one basket.
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embodying the individual-level model-by, for example, placing
the burden on the individual of deciding whether a file will be
readable or unreadable-will encourage individuals to make
informed judgments about whether a piece of information is eco-
nomically valuable. Given their informational advantages, indi-
viduals are generally best suited to determine whether their own
possessions are valuable and take the necessary steps to preserve
and exploit that value.
In the context of encouraging free expression, the law should
do no more than look to the speaker herself. Entrusting others to
monitor speech on the Internet-which would result from adopt-
ing the system-level model in the context of speech regula-
tion-would produce a chilling effect on the Internet. Adopting
the individual-level model in this context will produce a mini-
mum of regulation antithetical to the values of the First Amend-
ment, without producing the undesirable cacophony that would
result were the law to adopt an open-system conception in the
context of speech regulation.
Finally, respecting individual autonomy will encourage pro-
duction of information on the Internet. If, in short, an individual
is given the power to control whether and how the law will pro-
tect her possessions in Cyberspace, she will feel more confident
about introducing those resources onto the Information Super-
highway.
CONCLUSION
Given the unconventional nature of the Internet, the bound-
aries that define property rights will sometimes best be drawn
along nontraditional lines. Some situations will call for the recog-
nition of boundaries at the system level. When the interests of
system users are united, and the need to exclude is paramount,
this is certainly the case. However, when legislatures and courts
are called upon to craft boundary rules in other contexts, respect
for traditional boundaries may be inappropriate. In such circum-
stances, lawmakers must consider relevant interests, communi-
ties, and distributional aims when determining what boundaries
to protect.
If people are to function in the Internet's virtual environ-
ment, predictable lines must be drawn. To accomplish this goal,
the law will have to enter and understand the virtual environ-
ment in which those it hopes to regulate have chosen to conduct
their business. The law, in short, must be made applicable if it is
to be applied.
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